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1 
 STATEMENT OF AMICUS INTEREST1 
The Black Lung Clinic (“Clinic”) is a legal clinic 
at the Washington and Lee University School of Law 
in Lexington, Virginia. The Clinic represents former 
coal miners and survivors who are pursuing federal 
black lung benefits. The Clinic’s clients are 
represented by a member of the law school faculty 
licensed to practice law who works closely with 
students in the Clinic. Students evaluate claims; 
develop evidence; conduct discovery, depositions, and 
hearings; and write motions, arguments, and 
appellate briefs. In attempting to collect benefits, 
miners and survivors face formidable teams of 
lawyers, paralegals, and doctors that the coal 
companies assemble to challenge these claims. The 
Clinic currently represents seventeen former coal 
miners and their spouses, with dozens of closed 
claims. Nearly seventy of these current and former 
clients are receiving benefits as a direct result of the 
changes to the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) 
made in the Affordable Care Act.  
Section 1556 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) makes two major 
changes to the Black Lung Benefits Act. These  
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, no counsel for a 
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person 
other than amici or their counsel made a monetary 
contribution to its preparation or submission. All parties 




changes remove limiting language to make it simpler 
for disabled miners and their families to establish 
that they are entitled to federal benefits. First, 
§ 1556(a) reinstates the fifteen-year rebuttable 
presumption, which presumptively entitles former 
coal miners to benefits if they have worked over 
fifteen years underground and have a totally 
disabling pulmonary disease. The second, § 1556(b), 
reinstates a continuation of benefits for surviving 
spouses whose coal-mining spouse was receiving 
benefits at the time of their death. The clients of the 
Clinic already have benefitted from these 
amendments: nearly sixty former clients who are 
currently receiving black lung benefits could face 
modification proceedings and the loss of benefits if § 
1556 is not severed; clients with pending claims 
could face a change in their ability to prove their 
claims mid-process, and the ability of future miners 
to prove their entitlement to benefits will be injured. 
The Clinic has a profound interest in the possibility 
of the invalidation of the amendments. If the 
amendments are totally struck down it would 
adversely affect our clients; not only the ones 
currently enjoying benefits under the amendments, 
but all coal miners or surviving spouses who will 










I. SEVERABILITY MUST BE 
PRESUMED GIVEN THAT § 1556 IS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID, CAN 
FUNCTION INDEPENDENTLY, AND 
IS CONSISTENT WITH CONGRESS’ 
OBJECTIVES IN ENACTING THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT. 
The framework for severability is well 
established, asking what “Congress would have 
intended in light of the Court’s constitutional 
holding . . . .” See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. 
Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932); 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) 
(citing Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996) 
(“Would Congress still have passed” the valid 
sections “had it known” about the constitutional 
invalidity of the other portions of the statute?) 
(internal quotations omitted). In answering this 
question, the Court must “refrain from invalidating 
more of the statute than is necessary.” See Booker, 
543 U.S. at 258 (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 
641, 652 (1984)). The Court “must retain those 
portions of the Act that are (1) constitutionally valid, 
(2) capable of functioning independently, and (3) 
consistent with Congress' basic objectives in 
enacting the statute.” See id. at 258-59 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). The last prong is 
concerned with legislative intent and whether 
Congress would have preferred an Act severed to no 
Act at all. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. 
New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006). This 




asked in the present rather than the past; the 
relevant question is “not whether the legislature 
would [have] prefer[red] (A+B) to B” but “whether 
the legislature would prefer not to have B if it could 
not have A as well.” See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 
137, 143 (1996). And in the absence of evidence that 
Congress would prefer no Act at all, the Court must 
defer to the legislature. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. 
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 
(2010) (“[N]othing in the statute's text or historical 
context makes it 'evident' that Congress . . . would 
have preferred no Board at all to a Board whose 
members are removable at will.”). 
The test therefore embodies a presumption in 
favor of preserving as much of the law as possible, 
requiring proof of legislative intent contrary to 
severability. The Court has also historically noted 
the existence of this presumption. Since Marbury v. 
Madison, courts have presumed severability, 
recognizing that the Court does not have the power 
to strike a law that is not constitutionally invalid. 
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 
(rendering unenforceable § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 but leaving other sections in effect, since an Act 
of the legislature must be repugnant to the 
Constitution to be voided by the Court). It is out of 
this tradition that this doctrine continues to embody 
a presumption in favor of judicial restraint, favoring 
severability when possible. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 
328-29; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 321 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting in part) (discussing the presumption of 
severability); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 
(1984) (“[T]he presumption is in favor of 




Planned Parenthood of North New England 
addressed this separation of powers concern 
explicitly, stating that: 1) nullifying the legislature’s 
work beyond what is necessary “frustrates the intent 
of the elected representatives of the people,” 2) the 
Court must restrain itself from rewriting law “even 
as [it] strive[s] to salvage it,” and 3) the “touchstone 
for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, 
for a court cannot ‘use its remedial powers to 
circumvent the intent of the legislature.’” See Ayotte, 
546 U.S. at 328-30. 
As a result, a reviewing court must “try to 
limit the solution to the problem. . . . sever[ing] 
problematic portions while leaving the remainder 
intact.” See id. at 328-29; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 
at 508 (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 
U.S. 491, 504 (1985) (“[The] normal rule is that 
partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the 
required course.”). 
a) Precedent shows a consistent application 
of these principles, finding severing to be 
the appropriate remedy. 
 The Court’s application of this doctrine in 
United States v. Booker is instructive. See United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (severing only 
two statutory provisions which 1) made the 
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory, or 2) depended on 
the Guidelines’ mandatory nature).  
First, the Court identified that the 
constitutional conflict was limited to the Sentencing 
Guidelines’ mandatory nature. See id. at 259-60. It 




without the “mandatory” provisions, could function 
independently. See id. Accordingly, the Court struck 
only the provisions related to the mandatory effect of 
the Guidelines, making the Guidelines advisory. See 
id. at 246 (“The . . . approach, which we now adopt, 
would . . . make the Guidelines system advisory 
while maintaining a strong connection . . . to the 
increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress 
intended its Guidelines system to achieve.”). The 
Court cautioned that because of the complexity of 
the statute, its “interrelated provisions, and a 
constitutional requirement that creates fundamental 
change – we cannot . . . determine likely 
congressional intent mechanically.” See id. at 248. In 
making this determination, the Court found that the 
remaining provisions (now advisory in nature) were 
still consistent with Congress’ basic sentencing 
intent – “to move the sentencing system in the 
direction of increased uniformity.” See id. at 253. 
 It is true that at the time the Act was passed, 
Congress clearly intended a mandatory set of 
Guidelines, not intending to pass them in an 
advisory form. See id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Congress explicitly rejected as a model for reform 
the various proposals for advisory guidelines that 
had been introduced in past Congresses.”). This is 
not the correct point of analysis; such an approach 
would have the effect of systematically invalidating 
any analysis regarding severability. See Leavitt, 518 
U.S. at 143-44 (1996) (stating that a determination 
that “a legislature bent on banning almost all 
abortions would prefer . . . to ban no abortions at all 
rather than merely some” was “at the very least, 




provision of the Guidelines already took on the force 
of law, and the perspective must shift; Congress’ 
intent then becomes a counterfactual question 
asking what Congress would intend now, after 
learning that mandatory provisions were struck. See 
id. at 143. It was with this perspective in Booker 
that the Court acted with restraint, refusing to 
invalidate Congress’ work in total when the 
remaining provisions would add various new 
protections furthering its objectives. 
 This focus on Congress’ holistic purpose in 
enacting the law, and the ability of the remaining 
provisions to further this purpose, has historically 
driven the Court’s analysis.  Under this 
methodology, the Court has found that 
unconstitutional legislative veto provisions did not 
interfere with the purpose of the remaining 
provisions under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act allowing for the suspension of deportation 
proceedings in extreme circumstances. See INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 934-35 (1983). A legislative 
veto provision also did not interfere with favorable 
provisions for the airline industry which were 
intended to de-regulate this market. See Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 696 (1987). In 
both cases, the Court noted Congress’ lack of 
discussion of the legislative veto with respect to the 
remaining provisions, inferring the unconstitutional 
provision’s relative unimportance in these 
mechanisms. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934 (“[T]here 
is insufficient evidence that Congress would have 
continued to subject itself to the onerous burdens of 
private bills had it known that § 244(c)(2) would be 




U.S. at 697 (“In the almost total absence of any 
contrary refrain, we cannot conclude that Congress 
would have failed to enact the Airline Deregulation 
Act . . . if the legislative veto had not been 
included.”). Likewise, the Court has also found that 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act remained “fully operative” in 
its purpose even if the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board’s unconstitutional, dual layered 
removal restrictions, fell. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 
U.S. at 509. The Court also refused to invalidate 
Congress’ policy of shifting responsibility for 
regulating the disposal of radioactive waste to the 
States. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
151-52 (1992). In New York v. United States, the 
Court identified “three types of incentives [the 
legislature had added] to encourage the States to 
comply with their statutory obligation to provide for 
the disposal of waste generated within their 
borders.” Id. at 152. When one of these incentives 
(the take title provision) was struck, the Court 
reasoned that “[c]ommon sense suggests that where 
Congress has enacted a statutory scheme for an 
obvious purpose, and where Congress has included a 
series of provisions operating as incentives to 
achieve that purpose, the invalidation of one of the 
incentives should not ordinarily cause Congress' 
overall intent to be frustrated.” See id. 
 Finally, this precedent is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision to sever certain Medicaid 
expansion provisions of the Affordable Care Act 
given their capacity to continue to function in a way 
that is “consistent with Congress’ basic objectives in 
enacting the statute.” See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 




543 U.S. at 259). Specifically, the remaining 
provisions continued to further the purpose of the 
Affordable Care Act because “nothing in our opinion 
precludes Congress from offering [additional] funds 
under the Affordable Care Act to expand the 
availability of health care, and requiring that States 
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on 
their use.” See id. at 585. Where withdrawing 
existing funds for Medicaid was unconstitutional, 
new funding could still be offered as an incentive 
encouraging States to participate in the federal 
government’s healthcare initiatives. See id. at 585. It 
was not evident that Congress would have wanted to 
strike down the rest of the PPACA, “had it known 
that the States would have a genuine choice whether 
to participate in the new Medicaid expansion.” See 
id. at 587. In fact, there was no evidence that 
“Congress would have wanted the whole Act to fall, 
simply because some [states] may choose not to 
participate.” See id. In the absence of evidence that 
Congress would have objected to these remaining 
provisions, the Court acted with proper restraint by 
severing only the plainly defective provisions. 
b) Justice Scalia’s dissent in Nat'l Fed'n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius does not follow 
this precedent. 
 In his dissent, Justice Scalia recasts the 
doctrinal test as following: 1) whether “the 
provisions will work as Congress intended” and 
2) whether “Congress would have enacted them 
standing alone and without the unconstitutional 
portion.” See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 692-93 (Scalia, J. 
dissenting). However, his understanding of the 




“many provisions . . . are ancillary to its central 
provisions . . . [or] entirely unrelated – hitched on 
because it was a quick way to get them passed 
despite opposition, or because their proponents could 
exact their enactment as the quid pro quo for their 
needed support.” Id. at 705. Although Justice Scalia 
concedes that many of the minor provisions can 
function independently and as intended without the 
unconstitutional provision, he attacks the second 
prong. See id. (“Some provisions, such as requiring 
chain restaurants to display nutritional content, 
appear likely to operate as Congress intended . . . .”). 
He argues that “[o]ften, a minor provision will be the 
price paid for support of a major provision. So, if the 
major provision were unconstitutional, Congress 
would not have passed the minor one.” See id. at 704. 
 This is not the proper question under 
traditional severability doctrine. First, this doctrine 
of judicial restraint is based on the fact that each 
provision did pass into law. See Brett M. 
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 
Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2148 (2016) (asking how the 
Court would know “what . . . the Members of 
Congress who voted for the bill, would have wanted? 
Is this even the right question to be asking?”). The 
reason for the Court’s separation of powers concerns 
stems from this acknowledgment. Justice Scalia 
construes the purpose of the Affordable Care Act so 
narrowly that he must create two unequal classes of 
laws: major and minor bargain provisions. See 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J. dissenting) 
(arguing that the purpose of the PPACA was to 
provide universal coverage, with all other provisions 




program). This is improper. Additionally, Justice 
Scalia fails to follow precedent showing that the 
analysis of Congressional intent is not to be 
conducted as if from the time of an Act’s passage but 
should be a hypothetical analysis of what Congress’ 
intent would be if faced with the present situation. 
See discussion supra Part I. These failings, in 
addition to the strong presumption in favor of 
severability and lack of contrary evidence of 
legislative intent, are conclusive. See id. 
 These problems flow through to Justice 
Scalia’s analogy inquiring whether superfluous 
“ornamental” provisions also fall when the Court 
cuts down the tree they adorn. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
at 705 (Scalia, J. dissenting). In actuality, each 
“ornament” or minor provision of the Affordable Care 
Act is its own separate tree, lawfully passed by 
Congress, as one small organism in the forest of laws 
enacted under the PPACA. Justice Scalia asks the 
wrong question. The proper question is whether the 
minor provisions are left standing to support the 
PPACA’s purpose even if one of its trees – the 
individual mandate – falls.  
c) The few cases in which the Court, before 
and after Sebelius, refused to sever 
maintain a focus on the “domino effect” 
of the unconstitutional provision. 
Severing is not appropriate when the law 
must be substantially overwritten or restructured, 
where the provision struck is so central to the 
remaining provisions that the legislature would not 
have intended them to function on their own. The 




when the remaining, closely intertwined provisions 
establish prohibitions on state and individual rights 
rather than Congress’ addition of regulatory 
incentives or rights. In Randall v. Sorrell, for 
example, the Court struck down a Vermont 
campaign finance statute’s limitations on campaign 
expenditure and contribution on First Amendment 
grounds. 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006). In its explanation 
that the remaining provisions implementing this 
prohibition were inseverable, the Court noted that 
severing would “require us to write words into the 
statute (inflation indexing), or to leave gaping 
loopholes (no limits on party contributions), or to 
foresee which of many different possible ways the 
legislature might respond to the constitutional 
objections we have found.” See id. In other words, 
the principles of severability (purpose of legislation, 
independent function of remaining provisions) in 
this case were so frustrated by the constitutional 
holding that the remainder of the Act could not be 
preserved without putting words into the mouth of 
the legislature.  
A similar problem occurred in Murphy v. 
NCAA. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484 
(2018). The Court found that provisions of 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(PASPA) prohibiting state licensing and 
authorization of sports gambling violated the anti-
commandeering rule. See id. at 1478. However, the 
Court refused to sever these provisions from 
PASPA’s separate prohibitions of state-run lotteries 
or its prohibitions on private actors sponsoring, 
operating, or promoting sports gambling. See id. at 




gambling in privately owned casinos while 
prohibiting state-run sports lotteries would have 
seemed exactly backwards” to the larger legislative 
scheme Congress intended. See id. at 1483. 
Similarly, prohibitions on advertising would not be 
appropriate because of the absurd result that 
severing would have; forbidding “the advertising of 
an activity that is legal under both federal and state 
law . . . is something that Congress has rarely done.” 
See id. at 1484. 
 Further, the Court discussed PASPA's 
prohibitions against private actors sponsoring, 
operating, or promoting sports gambling, stating 
that they “were obviously meant to work together 
with the provisions in § 3702(1) that impose similar 
restrictions on governmental entities . . . we do not 
think [Congress] would have wanted the former to 
stand alone.” See id. at 1483. Specifically, § 3702(2) 
and § 3702(1) were intended as a joint legal 
mechanism to sue States for authorizing private 
parties in sports gambling schemes in addition to 
private parties when they were authorized by States 
to engage in this conduct. See id. at 1483-84. Where 
“Congress lacks the authority to prohibit a State 
from legalizing sports gambling, the prohibition of 
private conduct . . . ceases to implement any 
coherent federal policy.” Id. at 1483. In Randall and 
Murphy, when prohibitions on campaign 
contributions and prohibitions on private casinos 
fell, the roots of those trees were too closely 





II. APPLICATION OF THIS PRECEDENT 
SHOWS THAT § 1556 OF THE PPACA 
MUST BE PRESERVED. 
 First, none of the defects in Randall or 
Murphy are present in this case. If the individual 
mandate were excised, § 1556 would stand after the 
dust clears. The individual mandate is not closely 
intertwined with § 1556 of the PPACA. Section 1556 
makes two major changes to the Black Lung Benefits 
Act. First, § 1556(a) reinstates the fifteen-year 
rebuttable presumption that existed prior to the 
1981 amendments to the BLBA. See Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 1556, 124 Stat. 260 (2010). Second, § 1556(b) 
reinstates a continuation of survivor benefits 
without requiring beneficiaries “to file a new claim 
for benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate the 
claim of such miner.” See id. The last provision, § 
1556(c), explains that these amendments apply to 
any claim filed after January 1, 2005. See id. With 
the exception of the last, these reinstated provisions 
existed before the individual mandate and would 
continue to function without it. Nothing in § 1556 
would have to be substantially rewritten; it is 
capable of functioning as intended.   
 Second, § 1556 is consistent with Congress’ 
intent and objectives in enacting the statute. The 
broad purpose of the Affordable Care Act is reflected 
in the original Senate and House of Representative 
bills which ultimately were reconciled into the 
Affordable Care Act. The preceding Senate HELP 
Committee bill stated that the purpose of the bill 
was to “make quality, affordable health care 




health care quality, enhance disease prevention, and 
strengthen the health care workforce.” S. 1679, 
111th Cong. (2009). Similarly, the House of 
Representatives described the purpose of its bill to 
“provide affordable, quality health care for all 
Americans and reduce the growth in health care 
spending, and for other purposes.” H.R. 3962, 111th 
Cong. (2009). However, the clearest evidence of this 
broad purpose can be found in the text of the 
Affordable Care Act itself. The PPACA includes ten 
titles ranging in subject matter from “Quality, 
Affordable Health Care For All Americans,” to 
“Transparency and Program Integrity” and “Health 
Care Workforce,” and “Improving the Quality and 
Efficiency of Health Care.” See Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 260 (2010). Within these titles, Congress 
furthers its broad purposes by creating policy in a 
myriad of ways such as:  encouraging development of 
new patient care models to increase quality of 
healthcare, see id. §§ 3021-27, modernizing disease 
prevention and public health, see id. §§ 4001-04, 
providing new options for States to provide long-
term services, see id. §§ 2401-06, and enhancing 
health care education and training. See id. §§ 5301-
405. 
 The Black Lung Act amendments further the 
broad purposes of the Affordable Care Act. The 
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 
see Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 2(a), 83 Stat. 743 (1969) 
[hereinafter Mine Health and Safety Act], as further 
amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act, see Pub. L. 
No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 794 (1972), recognized that 




significant number of miners and their surviving 
dependents. See Mine Health and Safety Act § 2(a). 
The text of the law states its broad purpose – to 
protect the “health and safety of [the coal mining 
industry’s] most precious resource – the miner.” See 
id. The Country at this time faced an “urgent need to 
provide more effective means . . . to prevent death 
and serious physical harm, and . . . to prevent 
occupational disease originating in such mines.” See 
id. § 2(c). These problems were “a serious 
impediment to the future growth of the coal mining 
industry[,]” would “burden . . . commerce[,]” and 
“cause grief and suffering to the miners and to their 
families.” See id. § 2(b)-(d), (f). Congress’ policy was a 
decision to place responsibility and liability on mine 
operators “to prevent the existence of such conditions 
and practices” in accordance with mandatory federal 
requirements. See id. § 2(e), (g). 
 The § 1556 provisions amend Title IV within 
the Mine Health and Safety Act requiring miner 
operators to provide: 
benefits, in cooperation with the States, 
to coal miners who are totally disabled 
due to pneumoconiosis and to the 
surviving dependents of miners whose 
death was due to such disease; and to 
ensure that in the future adequate 
benefits are provided to coal miners and 
their dependents in the event of their 
death or total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis. Id. § 401. 
 This title serves the overall purpose of the 




incentive for employers to protect the workforce by 
preventing injury and disease. See id. §2. By 
restoring presumptions and administrative rules 
which favor the miner or survivor, the Affordable 
Care Act increased these existing regulatory 
pressures, and did so for similar purposes. This 
pressure shifts risk from individuals and onto 
employers, who are better positioned to avoid 
burdening the healthcare system with the costs of 
caring for sick miners, who may eventually succumb 
to black lung disease and leave a surviving 
dependent behind. In short, the § 1556 amendments 
are one example of a regulatory incentive added to 
further the Affordable Care Act’s purposes. See New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186 (stating that 
where “Congress has included a series of provisions 
operating as incentives to achieve that purpose, the 
invalidation of one of the incentives should not 
ordinarily cause Congress' overall intent to be 
frustrated.”). 
 The complete absence of legislative intent to 
the contrary solidifies this conclusion. In the only 
legislative history on record on this provision, 
Senator Byrd introduced § 1556 by remarking that:  
While this bill as passed may not 
satisfy the individual concerns of each 
and every constituent or member of 
Congress, it does begin to satisfy the 
growing needs of millions of Americans 
who find themselves without access to 
the medical services and attention they 
need. Access to proper health care for 
every American citizen should not only 




considered the commensurate right of 
any and every citizen of the mightiest 
and most advanced Nation the world 
has ever known. 156 Cong. Rec. S2083 
(daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Byrd). 
 He then describes the amendments, 
concluding that he looks “forward to working to 
ensure that claimants get a fair shake as they try to 
gain access to these benefits that have been so hard 
won.” See id. at 2084. There is no record of 
opposition to Senator Byrd’s remarks or the 
amendment’s passage on any grounds. As a result, 
the Court must retain § 1556 because it is without 
constitutional defect, capable of functioning 
independently from the individual mandate, and is 
consistent with Congress’ objectives in enacting the 
statute. 
III. EVEN ACCEPTING THE DISSENTING 
VIEW IN Sebelius, THE PRESENT 
CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A 
CHALLENGE UNDER THAT TEST. 
Even if the framework for analyzing 
severability suggested by Justice Scalia in Sebelius 
is accepted by the Court, the Court should still find § 
1556 severable. Under Justice Scalia’s framework, 
the Court would ask (1) whether the remaining 
provision[s] operate in a manner consistent with the 
intent of Congress, and (2) whether Congress would 
have enacted the remaining provision[s] without the 
unconstitutional portion. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 
692-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s 




whether Congress only passed the various “omnibus” 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act as a concession 
for provisions such as the individual mandate. See 
id. 
Although a significant reform, § 1556 was not 
“the price paid for support of a major provision” such 
as the individual mandate. See id. at 704. The lack of 
legislative history, or opposition to § 1556, first 
demonstrates this. Second, Justice Scalia’s concern 
that there is no “reliable basis for knowing” whether 
a provision like § 1556 would have been passed on its 
own can be disproved in this case. See id. at 705. 
Section 1556 is different from several prior 
unsuccessful attempts to amend similar parts of the 
BLBA. See Black Lung Benefits Survivors Equity 
Act, H.R. 228, 106th Cong. (Jan. 6, 1999) 
(reinstating automatic survivor's benefits at 30 
U.S.C. § 932(1)); S. 2685, 107th Cong. (June 26, 
2002) (reinstating 30 U.S.C. § 932(1) and § 921(c)(4)); 
H.R. 4236, 107th Cong. (April 16, 2002) (same); H.R. 
1988, 108th Cong. (May 6, 2003) (same); H.R. 300, 
109th Cong. (Jan. 26, 2005) (same); H.R. 1123, 110th 
Cong. (Feb. 16, 2007) (same); H.R. 1010, 111th Cong. 
(Feb. 12, 2009) (same). However, § 1556 differs from 
these past amendments by including subsection (c). 
None of these earlier proposed bills contained 
anything resembling § 1556(c), the retroactive 
application of these amendments to claims filed after 
January 1, 2005 and pending on or after March 23, 
2010. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556(c), 124 Stat. 260 
(2010). This “[c]ongressional doubt concerning 
judicial retroactivity doctrine . . . provide[s] a 




the previous versions. See Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 261 (1994). It would thus be 
improper to suggest that Congress would not have 
passed § 1556 due to the failure of past bills which 
did not address retroactivity.  
Additionally, when the PPACA was passed, 
the main obstacle to reaching a legislative bargain 
was the public option. See Robert Pear & David M. 
Herszenhorn, Senate Says Health Plan Will Cover 
Another 31 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at 
A1. Once Senator Reid introduced the Senate’s 
initial health-care reform bill, which included a 
public option, he faced resistance immediately from 
fellow Democrats. See H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 1323 
(Nov. 19, 2009) (unenacted version with public 
option). After a month of opposition to the public 
option, Senator Nelson (D-FL) asked: “How do we 
bring it together so we can get the high threshold of 
60 votes in the Senate?” See 155 Cong. Rec. S13078 
(daily ed. Dec. 12, 2009). And thus, the Senate 
leadership dropped the public option, and the 
“legislative bargain” was struck. See David M. 
Herszenhorn & David D. Kirkpatrick, Lieberman 
Gets Ex-party to Shift on Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 2009, at A1 (citing Senator Lieberman’s 
opposition to, and subsequent drop of, the public 
option as the impetus for passage in the Senate).  
Instead of a public option, Congress implemented a 
system modeling Massachusetts’ combination of 
“insurance market regulations, a[n] [individual] 
coverage mandate, and tax credits” to support 
popular requirements such as guaranteed issue and 
community rating provisions without causing an 




Ct. 2480, 2485-86 (2015). After agreeing that the 
structure of the Affordable Care Act would improve 
upon the existing model of healthcare rather than a 
pure public option, new regulatory incentives 
supporting and using the insurance model as a way 
to implement broad healthcare reform goals could 
begin. This is the likely reason why Senator Reid 
exclaimed, “I don't know if there is a senator that 
doesn't have something in this bill that was 
important to them . . . .” See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 
704 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
This, in addition to the absence of evidence that § 
1556 was contested or contingent upon the passage 
of another provision, is decisive on the issue of 
severability. Any other result would undermine the 
principle that the votes cast by Congress’ members 
are the ultimate proof of Congress’ intent. Careful 
excision is necessary in order to preserve the will of 
the legislative branch and the welfare of the people 
it represents. The consequences of failing to adhere 
to this rule are especially severe when the Court’s 
ruling will revoke benefits that citizens have 
received from Congress. 
IV. IF THE BYRD AMENDMENTS ARE 
INSEVERABLE, THE COURT 
SHOULD NOT APPLY ITS DECISION 
RETROACTIVELY BECAUSE DOING 
SO WOULD CAUSE INJUSTICE AND 
HARDSHIP TO INDIVIDUALS WHO 
HAVE RELIED ON THE BYRD 
AMENDMENTS IN THEIR CASES. 
 Even if the Byrd amendments are not found to 




apply its decision prospectively.  A retroactive 
application would severely harm individuals who 
have relied on the Byrd amendments, and would 
impose substantial inequitable results in individual 
cases. Constitutional remedies are generally limited 
to the minimal remedy necessary to cure the 
constitutional defect. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 
at 508-09 (2010).  
 A decision here that applies retroactively could 
open the door to modification of past decisions in 
black lung cases.  According to the Department of 
Labor’s regulation governing black lung claims, a 
modification is granted when a litigant 
“demonstrates a change in condition [or] a mistake 
in a determination of fact.” 20 C.F.R. § 725.310. 
These proceedings may be initiated by an employer 
“any time prior to one year after the date of the last 
payment of compensation.” 33 U.S.C. § 922.  Thus, it 
is possible that employers will assert that changes in 
the Act brought about by the invalidation of the 
Byrd amendments are changes in conditions 
permitting a modification.  See Peabody Coal Co. v. 
Adler, 40 Fed. Appx. 54, 58-59 (6th Cir. 2002).  Also, 
employers may seek to relitigate cases under a 
mistake of fact theory where the miner or spouse 
received benefits based on the presumptions 
contained in the Byrd amendments.  If a court were 
to accept these arguments, all claims that are 
currently in pay status could be in jeopardy of facing 
a modification claim. This would not only flood the 
Department of Labor’s already-overburdened system 
with re-opened claims, but it would work a 
substantial injustice on miners and surviving 




themselves having to once again spend years 
litigating claims they have already won.  Further, if 
they lost, employers or the Department of Labor 
could pursue miners and surviving spouses for the 
pay they had already received.  This would work a 
substantial injustice upon the very people the Black 
Lung Benefits Act is intended to protect. 
 The Court has historically rejected retroactive 
application of its decisions when doing so would 
impair important government programs. See 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982) (finding that 
retroactive application in a case of first impression 
was not necessary to the holding and “would surely 
visit substantial injustice and hardship upon those 
litigants who relied upon the Act’s vesting of 
jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts.”). In the 
context of the black lung benefits program, a 
retroactive application of the law would severely 
impair the program. Retroactive application would 
increase the burden on already-overburdened 
Department of Labor dockets. This harm to the 
program would substantially delay and interrupt 
access to benefits for thousands of former coal 
miners and their widows whose claims and 
livelihood rely on black lung decisions. Rather, the 
Court should consider a prospective application of its 
holding as it has done in the past. Whether a 
decision should apply prospectively in civil cases has 
traditionally been governed by the nonretroactivity 
test articulated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 
U.S. 97, 106 (1971). According to that test, the Court 
may apply a decision non-retroactively when the 




might be unfair or cause harm to individual parties 
if applied retroactively. See id. at 106-07. 
Additionally, this Court has held that “[w]here a 
decision of this Court could produce substantial 
inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is 
ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or 
hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” Cipriano 
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969). 
 The Court should apply this approach in the 
current situation, if it finds that severability is not 
an appropriate remedy.  Further, the Court should 
specify that its holding does not apply retroactively.  
This is both to avoid worsening the backlog of cases 
within the Department of Labor, and to avoid 
injuries to disabled miners, surviving spouses and 
other dependents of deceased coal miners, many of 
whom depend on the payment of benefits to afford 
their basic necessities.  
CONCLUSION 
It must be presumed that § 1556 should be 
severed from the Affordable Care Act if the 
individual mandate is struck. The provision is 
constitutionally valid, functions independently of the 
individual mandate, is consistent with Congress’ 
objectives, and is untainted by evidence that the 
legislature would prefer no Act at all to an Act 
severed. Further, even if dissenting views on the test 
for severability are adopted, § 1556 should be 
preserved. The passage of § 1556 was not a 
concession that Congress made for the individual 
mandate. The individual mandate and insurance-
based implementation model was the compromise for 




Affordable Care Act initiatives. There is no 
opposition in the record to § 1556. Further, these 
amendments were altered from previously 
unsuccessful proposals by adopting a new 
retroactivity provision which allowed them to pass.  
Given the weight of precedent and the lack of 
contrary legislative intent, the Court must preserve 
the will of Congress. The consequences of striking § 
1556, as with many other provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act, are widespread and dramatic. 
The Court must tread carefully to avoid stifling the 
voice of the people, expressed through their 
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